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Membership loyalty is the inherent challenge of the cooperative model. All forms of 
collective action must provide the right incentives for members to prevent defection and free-
riders (Olson). The marginal benefits from cooperation for the individual must exceed the 
benefits gained from the alternative—non-cooperation. In the considerable body of literature that 
analyzes membership commitment to agricultural cooperatives, the non-cooperative alternative 
for farmers is to sell on a spot-market or patronize an investor-owned firm (e.g., Albaek and 
Schultz; M. Fulton; Fulton and Giannakas; Karantininis and Zago; Sexton 1986 and 1990; and 
Zeuli and King). In principle, cooperatives are not supposed to directly compete with each other. 
The concept of solidarity is as old as the cooperative model and is still promoted in 
internationally recognized cooperative principles.
1 However, the success of agricultural 
cooperatives in the US means that in many industries and markets cooperatives are competing 
with other cooperatives. For example, in the major dairy production states of California, 
Wisconsin, and Minnesota, more than 50 dairy cooperatives may compete annually for farmer’s 
milk.
2 The effect of such cooperative competition on member loyalty has not yet been explored 
in the literature. 
The findings from most of the studies analyzing the non-pecuniary determinants of 
cooperative membership loyalty are no longer relevant when cooperatives rather than investor-
owned firms (IOFs) are testing that loyalty. For example, the degree of membership 
homogeneity, which is generally considered a primary factor in determining cooperative 
commitment (Fulton and Giannakas; Izraeli, Pizam, and Neumann), would be similar for most 
                                                 
1 The sixth cooperative principle adopted by the International Cooperative Alliance in 1995 is “cooperation among 
cooperatives.” 
2 The cooperatives that are competing include those incorporated in the state as well as those headquartered 
elsewhere that have national memberships (e.g., Land O’Lakes in Minnesota or DFA in Missouri).  
  1cooperatives competing in a single industry. Likewise, these cooperatives would also be 
comparable in terms of other factors such as their locality and community involvement (Fulton). 
If the cooperatives are large firms (e.g., Land O’Lakes, it buys its milk from farmers of different 
states) and they are competing for non-local commodities, many members will not live in the 
same community in which the cooperative is located, thus negating the importance of these 
variables. Further, the idea that members are more likely to be loyal to a cooperative if they 
value the ideological concept of a cooperative business (M. Fulton) is only salient when the 
alternative is a non-cooperative. We know from standard game theory models of cooperatives 
that members will defect when the returns associated with such a strategy exceed the cooperative 
returns (Staatz, J. Fulton). Therefore, if another similar cooperative offers better financial returns 
than the member is receiving from their current cooperative, we would expect that member to 
defect. The financial returns would be the only differentiation between the alternative pay-offs. 
We analyze the issue of membership loyalty in the presence of cooperative competition 
in the context of the dairy industry in Wisconsin. Cooperatives have a long, strategic history in 
the dairy sector and now capture a significant market share, which makes it a compelling 
industry to study the effects of their competition. In addition, since the commodity is perishable 
it is essentially marketed every day by the farmer yet there are few legally binding supply 
contracts. In general, farmers enter into annual supply contracts with a milk buyer but either 
party can terminate the contract before renewal with some advance notice, which may be as little 
as a few days. In markets with excess dairy manufacturing capacity (i.e., the demand for milk 
outstrips supply), the competition for milk can be intense; this has been the situation in recent 
years in both Minnesota and Wisconsin and may soon be happening in California as well. As a 
result, the opportunities for member disloyalty in such dairy sectors are high. 
  2We use a unique data set collected from a comprehensive survey of 724 dairy farmers in 
Wisconsin in 2003 that is representative at the state level. The survey elicited responses about 
operator demographics as well as farm characteristics, including milk marketing patterns. Our 
data shows that 27 percent of the sample switched buyers at some point during 1997-2001. Of 
this group, 49 percent were co-op members. The co-op members who switched milk buyers 
generally chose another cooperative (68 percent of the sample of co-op members that switched). 
This suggests that there is a group of farmers that are more loyal to the cooperative model than to 
a single cooperative. We estimate three separate logit models that empirically explore the 
determinants of switching milk buyers. We are especially interested in finding out whether co-op 
members are less likely to switch milk buyers than non-co-op members and for those co-op 
members who are switching milk buyers, whether they are choosing another co-op or an IOF. 
The answers to these questions are important to the dairy industry as well as to cooperatives in 
general.  
  The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the following section we present a 
simple theoretical model that explores the loyalty incentives dairy farmers confront in the 
presence of cooperative competition. We describe our empirical models in section three, 
followed by a description of the data in section four. The results are discussed in section five and 
we conclude with a brief summary of the article’s findings on member loyalty with competing 
cooperatives. 
2. Theoretical Hypotheses 
Consider a single period duopsony model with a representative dairy farmer and two 
competing milk buyers. The firms provide the same goods and service to the farmer and offer 
  3contracts that may only differ in terms of premium/discount schedules.
3 The contract is exclusive 
and requires the farmer to sell her entire milk supply to the firm but it is not binding. These 
contracting terms are consistent with standard dairy contracting protocol and justify the use of a 
single-period model. The farmer chooses a marketing strategy that maximizes her net profit 
function. We assume the dairy farmer produces a single commodity (milk) that can only be sold 
under contract to one of the two competing firms (i.e., there is no spot market).  
The farmer’s net profit function contains two benefit streams: X and Y. The first, X, 
represents the revenue from selling all of her milk Q to either firm 1 or 2: 
(1)  
12 (1 ) . X PQ PQ δδ =+ −  
Therefore, PP
1 represents the contract premium/discount schedule offered by firm 1 and P
2
P  
represents the schedule offered by firm 2.  The farmer’s discrete marketing choice is represented 
by the binary variable  [0,1] δ = .  
  The farmer also receives some returns associated with their membership to a cooperative. 
We let Y represent the direct returns from the farmer’s investment in cooperatives:  
(2)   ,   YR E =+
where R represents the annual cash patronage refunds from the cooperatives and E the 
discounted future stream of equity returns. More precisely, the cash patronage refunds can be 
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3 Milk buyers compete on premiums and discounts because the base price is set by federal marketing policies. 
Premiums may be based on volume or quality attributes beyond those specified in the federal order, while discounts 
may be applied to fixed pick-up charges and quantity-based hauling costs (Hughes and Jesse). The supply contracts 
for milk include a guaranteed premium/discount schedule for the duration of the contract.  







Q ∑ represents the total quantity of milk cooperative k purchases from all its members J (j 
= 1, 2, …, J) where i . This patronage ratio is multiplied by cooperative k’s net profits 
allocated to cash patronage refunds 
J ∈
k Π  to achieve the patronage refunds returned to farmer i. In 
the case of a mixed duopsony (cooperative competing with an IOF), let firm 1 represent the 
cooperative and firm 2 the non-cooperative. Therefore, when  0 δ =  the farmer will be selling her 
milk to the IOF, then R (the term that represents cash patronage refund) will not longer be 
relevant, since IOFs do not distribute profits with their milk providers. 
The discounted future stream of equity returns E includes the hazard of losing all future 
annual equity redemption payments TE, where TE represents the total allocated equity member i 
has accumulated in the cooperative over time. More specifically, the equity return will be a 
hazard function with hazard rate m that is some decreasing function of the cooperative’s total 
patronage level from all members; the more the members patronize the cooperative, the less 
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where r is the discount rate and s the total number of years the member’s equity is held by the 
local cooperative.
4 Our specification conveys a free-rider incentive; the farmer i will receive her 
annual equity redemption as long as all other members patronize the cooperative (assuming their 
patronage is large relative to i's patronage).  
    The farmer’s decision problem can be fully specified as follows: 
                                                 
4 We assume first-in, first-out equity redemption policy. If we change this to an ad hoc redemption policy, e.g., 
based on retirement age, the results will change.  
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δδ Π= + + −  
where F represents the fixed costs associated with producing Q. We assume these are the only 
production costs and that the marketing decision does not convey any change in costs (e.g., a 
different hauling cost or pick-up charge based on the distance from the firm to the farm). The 
fixed cost assumption is justified because we are not considering any change in total milk 
production Q; it is also fixed. The costs associated with transporting milk are clearly a function 
of distance and thus, one might expect the costs to vary with the choice of milk buyer. However, 
in some markets, such as Wisconsin, there are still many milk buyers within a single trade 
territory meaning the change in distance (or hauling charges) would be negligible. Even in more 
spatially segregated markets, like California, many milk buyers may waive the transport fees as 
part of the incentive package they offer new customers.  
In the case of a mixed duopsony, the farmer will only be enticed to switch to or continue 
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The farmer will not receive any patronage refunds from the cooperative if she does not sell any 
milk to it, however, they will still receive equity redemption as long as other members patronize 
the firm (i.e., as long as it is not dissolved and has sufficient profits to return allocated equity). 
Actually, that is the case in our model, since we assume that only the analyzed farmer switch 
milk buyer (the others do not switch). Since the hazard rate m is a decreasing function of total 
member patronage, the equity term on the left hand side of the equation is greater than the one on 
the right hand side. The relative weight of the equity term depends on the total equity (TE) 
member i has accumulated in the cooperative; i.e., it is a function of their historic loyalty. For 
  6example, consider the case of a farmer who has never sold milk to a cooperative before. Equation 














The weight of the equity term also depends on its marginal contribution to the member’s profit 
function. For some farmers, this investment will be relatively small.  
In the case of two cooperatives competing for the farmer’s milk, the farmer will only be 
enticed to switch to or continue patronizing the same cooperative (firm 1) over a different 
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In this case, the loyalty decision is also a function of the relative magnitude of the total equity 
built up in each cooperative and the cooperative’s ability to redeem equity and the relative 
significance of member i to the total patronage of each cooperative. Note that we are assuming 
that the farmer has a history with firm 1 only. Indeed, to keep things simple, we are excluding 
the possibility that the farmer was a supplier of firm 2 at some moment in the past and switched 
to firm 1 and now is analyzing the possibility of switch to firm 2. 
  In both scenarios, the contract terms offered by the competing firms (PP
1 and P
2
P ) are 
clearly significant factors in the farmer’s decision to switch milk buyers. We expect larger 
farmers (those with greater Q’s) to receive more and better offers since the milk buyers are 
competing for product and, therefore, the most significant premiums they offer are based on 
volume.  
 
  73. Econometric Estimation 
  We estimate two models that test the influence of various farmer demographics and farm 
characteristics on the propensity to switch milk buyers. The first model uses a binary logit that 
explores the factors that determine switching regardless of firm structure. The second estimation 
employs a multinomial logit that separates the farms into three different switching categories to 
analyze the factors that affect switching to cooperative versus non-cooperative buyers.  
We adopt a standard index model (Wooldridge) and assume the decision to switch buyers 
is a straightforward function of the farmer’s cost-benefit comparison of the current buyer and the 
new buyer, or “suitor.” This model formulation has been used to analyze other farm management 
decisions, e.g., technology adoption (Barham, Foltz, Jackson-Smith, and Moon, 2004). The 
marginal benefit associated with switching to a new buyer can be specified as an unobservable 
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where i signals the individual farmer (i = 1, 2, …, n), the vector x
i represents the observed 
explanatory variables, β is a vector of parameters, and εi is an error term. We observe the 
farmer’s decision to switch milk buyers, but not the actual marginal benefit  associated with 
the switch to the new buyer. Therefore, we define the index function as follows: 
*
i y
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The probability of switching can thus be specified as function of the observed explanatory 
variables: 
(9) 
* P( 1 ) P( 0 ) ( ) ii yy G == >= i xx β'x , 
where ( ' ) i Gx β is a logistic function and εi has a standard logistic distribution. 
  8  If we let s = 0, 1, …, S represent the various unordered switching outcomes, we can 
define the binary outcomes as follows for our first model: 
   
*
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0 if 0 No  switching







We can define the outcomes for the multinomial logit in our second model in a similar fashion: 




0 if 0 No  switching
1 if  0 Switch to a new buyer that is a co-op












with the addition that in this model the marginal benefits are calculated separately for the 
situation where the new buyer is a cooperative c and where the new buyer is an investor-owned 
firm (IOF) f. The multinomial logit specification (versus a nested logit) appropriately models the 
non-sequential nature of the farmer’s decision. A farmer typically does not decide to switch milk 
buyers in absence of an offer from a new firm, a suitor. In other words, they do not decide to 
switch first and then decide which type of firm to sell their milk to. Their decision to switch is 
inexorably linked to the type of firm making the offer to buy their milk.
5  
  The vector of explanatory variables is consistent across both models and includes farmer 
and farm characteristics; descriptive statistics are provided in the following section. To avoid the 
endogeneity issue, when relevant we use explanatory variables from the first or baseline period 
(1997) to predict the probability of switching buyers any time over the next five years (1997-
2001). The drawbacks associated with this method are minimal since the farm and farmer 
characteristics do not dramatically change between 1997 and 2002 or change only by a constant 
(e.g., age).  
                                                 
5 Alternatively, we could model a multinomial logit with six separate outcomes (non switch, switch to a dairy farmer 
cooperative, switch to an independent cheese plant, switch to other independent milk processor, switch to an 
independent milk hauler/handler, switch to other typo of milk buyer), but insufficient data for each option prevented 
such an analysis.  
  9The explanatory variables include herd size, quality of milking facilities, herd growth, 
and retirement, which all serve as proxies for Q. Given our simple theoretical exposition in 
section two, we expect all of these variables, to have a positive influence on the farmer’s 
decision to switch because they will all entice better offers (higher P’s) from competing firms. 
We expect the farmers who retired during the period they reported switching milk buyers to have 
a negative effect on the decision to switch. The explanatory variables also include farm debt and 
a history of selling to cooperatives, which serve as proxies for the relative importance of the 
returns on equity to the farmer. History of selling to cooperatives also serves as a proxy of 
ideology (M. Fulton). We expect farmers with a history of selling to cooperatives to be less 
likely to switch from a cooperative to a non-cooperative since they would want to ensure their 
allocated equity (which would be greater than if they had no history of selling to cooperatives) 
would be returned and they may have ideological reasons to keep selling to cooperatives. The 
importance of price in the farmer’s decision to switch milk buyers is also included. We expect 
this to be a positive and significant variable in the generic switching decision, but to be less 
significant in the decision to switch from a cooperative to another firm. We include several other 
variables (e.g., farmer age and gender) to explore their possible influence on the decision to 
switch buyers.  
In order to test the significance of some variables identified by cooperative scholars as 
determinants of members un-loyalty (defect decision in a simple prisoner’s dilemma game, see 
Staatz and J. Fulton), we limit our sample to those farmers who used to sell to cooperatives (i.e., 
cooperative members) and estimate a binary logit model that analyzes the determinants of the 
switching decision. Therefore, instead of using the full set of explanatory variables, we only 
include those variables most commonly identified as significant predictors of loyalty in the 
  10literature: farm size, farm debt, milk price, and the location of the cooperative in the farmer’s 
community. We expect debt to positively affect the decision of co-op members to switch milk 
buyers, since the hypothesis is that highly indebted farmers discount more heavily the future, 
considering primarily present returns and not the long run benefits of their membership. We also 
expect that those farmers that want to patronize their local cooperative (indicator of ideology) 
will be less likely to switch their milk buyer. On the contrary, those that mostly care about the 
current price will be less likely to switch milk buyer (this variable may be an indicator of a high 
discount rate, and then play the same role as debt, or a proxy of lack of ideology regarding 
cooperatives). Finally, size is assumed to positively affect the switching decision, since the 
largest farmers are probably less dependent of their local economy and more tempted by non-
local milk buyers. 
4. Data Collection and Descriptive Statistics  
We use a unique data set collected from a comprehensive survey of 762 dairy farmers in 
Wisconsin in 2003.
6 The survey elicited responses about operator and household demographics 
as well as farm characteristics, including technology adoption, management practices and 
financial returns. Several questions specifically addressed milk marketing patterns at the farm 
level and most questions covered 1997 and 2002. Basic summary statistics for the sample, which 
is representative at the state level, are provided in table 1. The average farmer in our sample is 48 
years old and has completed 12.5 years of school. Nearly the entire sample (93 percent) is male 
and married (84 percent) and comes from a farm family (89 percent). 
                                                 
6 The survey was conducted by the Program on Agricultural Technology Studies (PATS) at the University of 
Wisconsin – Madison. Surveys were mailed to 1,694 randomly selected Wisconsin dairy farms; 45 percent (762) 
were completed by active dairy farmers (i.e., those milking cows on their farm in 2002). We only include data from 
the surveys completed by the primary farm operator (724). The sample represents farms where dairy is the primary 
enterprise (on average for the sample, dairy accounted for 87% of farm cash receipts in 1997) and farming is the 
main source of household income (on average for the sample, farm enterprises also accounted for 87% of household 
income in 1997).  
  11The average farm had a 66-cow dairy herd in 1997, which was typical for Wisconsin at 
the time, although the sample also captured extremely large and small farms. On average, the 
herds in the sample grew by 234% percent during 1997-2002. Note that this variable is highly 
affected by some farmers who went from practically no herd in 1997 to significant herd in 2002 
(those may be called new operators). Almost 32 percent of the sample reported that they had 
made some improvement in their milking facilities since 1997. However, 24 percent said they 
expected to retire before 2007. The average farm reported an annual household income (pre-tax) 
of nearly $62,000 and over 20 percent of the sample reported a debt-to-asset ratio that exceeded 
40 percent.  
In terms of marketing, 62 percent of the sample sold their milk to a cooperative during 
1997-2001. Price was reported as one reason for switching milk buyers by 60 percent of the 
sample, while the location of the existing or new milk buyer was one reason for only 22 percent 
of the sample. When comparing the sub-samples of the farmers who switched milk buyers during 
1997-2001 (27 percent of the sample) with those who did not switch (73 percent), there are only 
a few substantial differences. As expected, the farmers that switched milk buyers had larger 
herds on average and reported higher growth rates, but surprisingly fewer made improvements in 
their milk facilities. This may be explained by the fact that many in this sub-group had already 
modernized their facilities prior to 1997 (i.e., they comprise more modern dairy farms).  
For the sub-sample that did not switch, a higher percentage previously sold to 
cooperatives and not surprisingly price was a significant factor for fewer of the group’s farmers 
while location of the firm was a significant factor for more of the group when compared to the 
farmers who did switch buyers. The details on who farmers sold to and switched to are reported 
in table 2.  Over half the sample (63 percent) sold their milk to a dairy cooperative in 2002, 
  12compared to 62 percent in 1997.
7 Therefore, on the surface, this seems to be a fairly loyal group 
of dairy farmers. However, a fairly substantial proportion of the cooperative members who 
switched, switched from one cooperative to another (68 percent). The farmers reported selling to 
92 different firms; roughly one-third (32) of which are cooperatives (table 3).  
Why did they switch buyers? Our data suggests that farmers were largely induced to 
switch by competing firms (i.e., they were pulled rather than pushed). The farmers that switched 
were asked to mark all of the reasons they switched buyers as well as the single most important 
reason (table 4). The most important factor was clearly “better prices.” This response captured 
nearly 30 percent of all responses and was listed by 38 percent of the sample as the single most 
important reason. The farmers who did not switch buyers were asked the reasons behind their 
loyalty and here as well price was the predominant factor (table 5). The response “My current 
buyer offers very competitive prices” comprised 36 percent of all responses and 40 percent of the 
sample reported that it was the single most important reason for their loyalty. The two binary 
explanatory variables “price relevance” and “local relevance” (table 1) were created based on the 
responses reported in tables 5 and 6. Indeed, “price relevance” is a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 when the farmer checked price as a reason to switch milk buyer (if he did switch) or to 
be loyal (if he did not switch milk buyer). In the same fashion, “local relevance” is a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 when the farmer checked location of the milk buyer as a reason to 
switch milk buyer or to be loyal.  
 
 
                                                 
7 Although not reported, we tested the difference in means for the variables reported in table 1 between two sub-
samples: the farmers who usually sold their milk to a co-op and those who usually sold to non-cooperatives. There 
were no significant differences between the two groups for most of the variables. The only significant variables were 
“switch” and “switch specified.”  
 
  135. Results and Discussion 
The results from the binomial logit model that analyzed the decision to switch milk 
buyers regardless of firm structure are reported in table 6. The most interesting finding is that the 
farmers who previously sold their milk to a cooperative were significantly less likely (by a factor 
of 13 percent) to switch milk buyers than the dairy farmers who normally sold their milk to IOFs, 
as we expected. Also, as we predicted, farms with larger herds were significantly more likely to 
switch milk buyers, although the magnitude of the marginal effect is quite small (less than 1 
percent). Farmers that consider price as an important reason to switch or to be loyal to their milk 
buyers are significantly more likely to switch. Finally, age is weakly significant but has a 
different sign than we expected; older farmers are more likely to switch milk buyers. This may 
be explained by reasoning that as farmers near retirement they will want to maximize their 
returns. 
The results from the multinomial logit model that analyzed the decision to switch 
accounting for different firm structure (Y=0 not switch milk buyer, Y=1 switch to a milk buyer 
that is a co-op, Y=2 switch to a milk buyer that is an IOF) are reported in table 7. Our results 
show several significant differences between the farmers that do not switch and those that do. 
We also find significant differences between the farmers that switch to a co-op and those that 
switch to an IOF. The farmers that don’t switch have significant smaller dairy herds than those 
that switch to a cooperative. Further, those that don’t switch are significantly more likely to have 
a history of selling to cooperatives, are older, have lower herd’s growth rates and are more likely 
to be indebted than the farmers who switch to an IOF buyer. Perhaps the most interesting finding 
is that a history of selling to cooperatives is only a significant factor in determining switching to 
a non-cooperative. The coefficient estimate is also negative for switching to a cooperative, but 
  14the magnitude is substantially smaller and it is not significant at the normal confidence levels. 
This result suggests that a history of selling to cooperatives leads to greater loyalty with milk 
buyers.  
  The results from the estimation of the binomial logit with the co-op member sub-sample 
are reported in table 8. The only significant variable is price relevance, which has a positive 




The success of dairy cooperatives in the US has bred aggressive cooperative competition 
in some markets, including Wisconsin and Minnesota. We analyzed the effects of such 
competition on member loyalty using a unique data set from Wisconsin dairy farmers. We find 
that indeed, cooperatives are competing against each other for member business. The farmers in 
our sample reported selling to 92 different firms; roughly one-third of which are cooperatives 
and the majority of the sample (60 percent) sells to a cooperative. Interestingly, in spite of the 
competition, a relatively small portion of the sample (27 percent) reported switching milk buyers 
during 1997-2001, a time when competition for milk was especially fierce in Wisconsin. This 
supports previous studies (McDonald) that suggest that milk producers are effectively under 
contract because of the prohibitive costs associated with marketing their commodity on a daily 
basis. However, of the co-op members that switched firms, 68% percent chose another 
cooperative.  
Our empirical results show that co-op members who have historically sold their milk to 
cooperatives are less likely to switch milk buyers in general, while older farmers with larger 
farms (in terms of herd size) are more likely to switch. When we consider the type of firm they 
                                                 
8 Reduced forms of the regression were also estimated but none produced any additional significant variables. 
  15switch to (cooperative or IOF), different factors affect their switching decision. Again, larger 
farms are more likely to switch to a cooperative. Farms that grew during 1997-2002 and have a 
farm debt-to-asset ration greater than 40 percent were more likely to switch to an IOF, while 
those who had a history of selling to cooperatives were less likely to switch to an IOF. These 
results suggest that cooperative members are loyal to the cooperative model but not necessarily 
to a specific cooperative. Cooperative members are less likely to switch milk buyers than non-
co-op members in general. Further, they are less likely to switch when the firm that is trying to 
lure them away is an IOF and not a cooperative. When analyzing the sub-sample of cooperative 
members, the only significant determinant of loyalty was the importance of price to the member. 
If price was an important variable in their decision to switch milk buyers, the co-op members 
were more likely to switch. 
For cooperatives interested in increasing member loyalty, our findings suggest that they 
should cooperate with other cooperatives. This would have the added benefit of decreasing their 
input prices. Further, they should replace general education about co-op benefits with education 
about their specific co-op benefits. Future research should analyze the effect of firm specific 
characteristics such as their equity redemption policies and size. As the dairy sector continues to 
grow while the number of dairy farms decreases, we can only expect more competition. 
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1. Lower bound = -100%. No upper bound; only 4.3% of the sample reported no cows in 1997 
(i.e., they were new farmers). On average, the farmers in the sample had 26.4 years of farming 
experience (age-age when started farming). The experience variable was highly correlated with 
age (89%) and therefore not included in the regression analysis. 
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    Total Sample  Switch  Not Switch 









=1 if sells milk to 










=1 if sells milk to 









1997 buyer—2002 buyer  N  % of Sample 




Non-cooperative→ Cooperative  35 5% 
Cooperative→ No switch  328 49% 
Cooperative→ Cooperative  63 9% 
Cooperative→ Non-cooperative  29 4% 
Total  685 100% 
1. The company that purchased most of the farm’s milk in 2002. 
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Dairy firm N Cooperative? Dairy firm N Cooperative?
Ag Price                                                                       1 No Kraft                                                                                10 No
Alaska Farmer Co-op                                                  1 Yes Krohn Dairy                                                                    6 No
ALTO                                                                          45 Yes Lagraders Hillside Dairy                                                 5 No
AMPI                                                                           63 Yes Lake y Lake                                                                     1 Yes
Antigo Cheese                                                             4 No Lamer's Dairy                                                                  1 No
Arpin (Simplot)                                                           1 No Land O' Lakes                                                                 38 Yes
Badger Dairies/Swiss Valley Farms                           1 No Le Sueur Cheese Company                                             3N
Baker Cheese                                                               4 No Liberty Milk                                                                    2 No
Belgioioso                                                                   5 No Linden Cheese                                                                 2 No
Berner Foods Corp                                                      1 No Lynn Dairy                                                                      12 No
Bunkow                                                                       1 No Manitowoc  Milk Producers Co-op                                 1 Yes
Burnett Dairy                                                              5 Yes Marathon Cheese                                                            2 No
Carr Valley                                                                  1 No Mid AM                                                                           1 Yes
Cascade Cheese                                                           3 No Midwest                                                                           2 Yes
Cassel Garden Co-op                                                  2 Yes Mullins                                                                            20 No
Cedar Grove Cheese                                                    1 No Nasonville Dairy                                                             10 No
Cedar Valley Cheese                                                   4 No National Farmers Organization                                       26 Yes
Chalet Cheese Coop                                                    2 Yes North Herden                                                                   1 Yes
Chula Vista                                                                  4 No Oak Grove Cheese                                                           2 No
Clarco Co-op                                                               1 Yes Oberweis Dairy                                                               1 No
Con Agra                                                                     5 No Old Country Farmers Co-op                                            7 Yes
Dairy Farmers of America                                          53 Yes Organic Valley                                                                3 Yes
Dairy State Cheese                                                      6 No Park Cheese                                                                     6 No
Davisco Co. - LeSueur Cheese, Le Sueur, MN          1 No Plainview                                                                         2 Yes
Dean                                                                            19 No Prairy Farmers of America                                              1 Yes
Decatur Dairy                                                              2 Yes Rosewood Dairy                                                              1 No
Dupont Cheese                                                            3 No Salemville Cheese Co-op                                                1 Yes
Eau Galle Cheese                                                        2 No Sartori Foods                                                                   2 No
Edelweiss                                                                    11 No Scenic Central Milk Co-op                                             1 Yes
Ellsworth Co-op                                                          18 Yes Scenic Valley Protein Milk Producers                            1 No
F & A Dairy                                                                4 No Schneider Cheese Inc.                                                     2 No
Family Dairies                                                             11 Yes Sorrento                                                                           2 No
Fennimore Branch Cheese Coop                                 1 Yes Springside Dairy                                                             1 No
Foremost                                                                      115 Yes Suttners Cheese                                                               1 No
GAD Cheese                                                               1 No Swiss Valley                                                                    31 Yes
Grand Meadow Co-op                                                 3 No Torkelson Cheese                                                            2 No
Grande                                                                         23 No Trega Foods                                                                     14 No
Grassland                                                                     5 No Uplands Cheese                                                               1 No
Hastings Co-op Creamery                                           2 Yes Verifine                                                                           6 No
Hill Valley Cheese                                                      1 Yes Wapsie Valley                                                                 4 Yes
Hillside Lagranders Dairy                                           1 No Weawega Milk Products                                                 1 No
Hustler Co-op                                                              3 Yes Westby Co-op Creamery                                                 6 Yes
Independent Butter & Cheese Plant                            1 No Weyauwega Milk Producers                                           10 No
K and K Cheese                                                          1 No White Clover Dairy                                                         9 No
Kemps                                                                         2 No Wisconsin Dairy State                                                     4 No
Klondike Cheese/ Monroe                                          1 No Zimmerman Cheese                                                         4 No
Total 714
Total Number of Co-ops 32
o
 
Note: the responses (N) represent the entire sample. 
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All Reasons  % 
Old buyer was bought out or merged with another business  12% 
New buyer is located closer to my farm  5% 
New buyer offered better prices  29% 
New buyer offered better premiums  20% 
New buyer offered lower hauling charges  13% 
New buyer was local business I wanted to support  7% 
Other 14% 
Total 100% 
Most Important Reason  % 
Old buyer was bought out or merged with another business  18% 
New buyer is located closer to my farm  4% 
New buyer offered better prices  38% 
New buyer offered better premiums  8% 
New buyer offered lower hauling charges  4% 




Table 5: Reasons for Staying with the Same Milk Buyer 
 
All Reasons  % 
I have too much equity invested in my co-op  14% 
My current buyer is a local business I wanted to support  10% 
I am loyal to my buyer; we have a good business relationship  11% 
Figuring out the benefits of switching is too costly  4% 
My current buyer offers very competitive prices  36% 
My current buyer offers very competitive services  20% 
There have not been any other options  6% 
Total 100% 
Most Important Reason  % 
I have too much equity invested in my co-op  11% 
My current buyer is a local business I wanted to support  14% 
I am loyal to my buyer; we have a good business relationship  18% 
Figuring out the benefits of switching is too costly  4% 
My current buyer offers very competitive prices  40% 
My current buyer offers very competitive services  4% 
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Table 6: Binomial Logit Analysis of Switching Milk Buyers 
Switch Milk Buyer 











Parents farmed  0.1226
(0.3490) 0.0241
Herd size 1997  0.0035
(2.0990) ** 0.0007
Herd growth  0.0139
(1.5690) 0.0027
Milk facility improvement  -0.1850
(-0.8010) -0.0363
Farm debt  0.2827
(1.1840) 0.0555
Household income  0.0000
(-0.8700) 0.0000
Co-op history  -0.6368
(-3.0630) *** -0.1250
Price relevance   0.3727
(1.7360) * 0.0732
Local relevance   -0.1396
(-0.5540) -0.0274
N  512
Percent correctly predicted  0.7324
Log likelihood function  -288.5581  
Chi-squared 29.3867  
Significance level  0.0058
Note: “No switch” is the comparison group. T-statistics are in parentheses. *indicates 
significance at the 10% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; and ***indicates 






  23Table 7: Multinomial Logit Analysis of Switching Milk Buyers by Firm Structure 
  Switch to Co-op  Switch to IOF 





























Herd growth  0.0069
(0.5430) 0.0006
0.0206 







Farm debt  0.0601
(0.1940) -0.0017
0.6220 







Co-op history  -0.0509
(-0.1860) 0.0130
-1.3003 
(-4.4830) ***  -0.1159









Percent correctly predicted  0.7260
Log likelihood function  -372.8449  
Chi-squared 53.7284  
Significance level  0.0011
Note: “No switch” is the comparison group. T-statistics are in parentheses. *indicates 
significance at the 10% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; and ***indicates 
significance at the 1% level. 
 
  24Table 8: Binomial Logit Analysis of Switching Milk Buyers for Co-op Member Sub-Sample 
 
Switch Milk Buyer 
Variables Coefficient  Marginal  Effects 
Constant -1.6018
(-5.9480) *** -0.2899 
Herd size 1997  0.0010
(0.4390) 0.0002 
Farm debt  0.1661
(0.5540) 0.0301 
Price relevance   0.5462
(2.0620) ** 0.0989 
Local relevance   0.0378
(0.1250) 0.0068 
N  361 
Percent correctly predicted  0.7590 
Log likelihood function  -196.8731  
Chi-squared 4.9615   
Significance level  0.2913  
Note: “No switch” is the comparison group. T-statistics are in parentheses. *indicates 
significance at the 10% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; and 
***indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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